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Abstract: My intent in this essay is not to discuss the actual content of Indigenous experiences 
and knowledges, as I have neither the requisite expertise nor experience to do so with any 
competence. Rather, what I wish to discuss are some implicit pitfalls in the idea of 
“Indigenization” when advocated in the context of Western metaphysical assumptions that have 
not been made explicit. Like it or not, this context is one in which we all now stand, but it is also 
disrupted by very different contexts, as revealed by the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for instance. More specifically, I wish to raise the possibility that an implicit 
ontological framework derived from Western European history may surreptitiously guide the 
negotiation of the interface between Western and Indigenous scholarship, and do so in a way 
that, rather than bringing about decolonization, actually may perpetuate colonization at more 
subtle and insidious levels. Drawing upon Heidegger’s work, I argue that making such ontological 
frameworks explicit increases the chance of success for any such interface by opening the door to 
what I will call “ontological respect” (to be distinguished from the respect of persons as commonly 
understood in terms of Western liberal democracy and human rights). To put it simply, if we are 
going to understand the other, we must also understand ourselves (where the “we” in this case 
refers to the settler heirs of Western history). Such ontological respect, I will argue, is itself made 
possible by a Heideggerian variant of the phenomenological “epochē” or suspension of 
presuppositions, which suggests an explicit methodology for intercultural exchange, a 
methodology I call the “intercultural epochē.”  
Keywords: Decolonization; Epochē; Heidegger; Indigenization/Indigeneity; Ontology; 
Phenomenology; Worldview 
 
WHAT IS RESPECT? 
While acknowledging the fact that, in its literal sense, “reconciliation” refers to 
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“the re-establishment of a conciliatory state” which “never has existed between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people,” Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) asserts that reconciliation “is about establishing and 
maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples in this country’.1 Hence for the TRC, reconciliation directs us 
back to respect. If the prefix “re-” in “reconciliation” is not quite accurate, 
perhaps the “re-” in “respect” might prove more fertile.  
Obviously, the word “respect” connotes more than one meaning as well. In 
Western liberal democracies we commonly think of respect in terms of rights: one 
respects the rights of others as rights-bearing individuals. The social contract is 
then fulfilled when I respect your rights and you respect mine. There’s a kind of 
territoriality in this: to each person there inherently belongs a sphere of rights 
that others are obliged to respect, which means that one must avoid violating 
anything in that sphere. “Belonging” indicates what is proper to a person, and 
hence property, as what is “proper to,” is already implied in the Western-liberal 
idea of rights. But rights operate at a macro-level: I can avoid violating your rights 
while disrespecting you in innumerable other ways that are not captured in rights-
based discourses and never will be. In this way rights are like one-size-fits-all 
clothing: they don’t fit anyone really well, but everyone can wear them.  
The word “respect” comes from the Latin word respicere, which with its prefix 
re- (“again, back, anew, against”) and suffix specere (“look at”) means “to look back 
at” and hence “to regard, consider.”2 Etymologically, then, respect entails a looking 
back or a revisiting, but it also implies a sense of renewal in the connotation of 
“anew.” Hence it is a looking back that simultaneously looks forward.3 However, 
 
1 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015). ‘What we have learned: Principles of truth and 
reconciliation’, 113. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/trc/IR4-6-2015-eng.pdf 
(http://publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.800280&sl=0) [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. Although my remarks 
regarding Indigeneity and the TRC in this essay are oriented by the Canadian context, I believe that the 
principle of ontological respect to be defended here is transferable to other contexts of intercultural 
interface. One such example, Heidegger’s account of a cultural exchange between a European and a 
Japanese scholar, will be explored below in greater detail. 
2 Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/respect#etymonline_v_45930 and 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/re-?ref=etymonline_crossreference [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
3 In this respect we might also call attention to the “transculturalist” approach to intercultural exchange 
which differs from that taken in this essay. Whereas transculturalism looks ahead to cultural meanings that 
evolve in the processes of intercultural exchange, my own approach derived from Heidegger will operate 
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there is also a sense of obligation. I don’t look back out of mere curiosity, nor even 
out of my own interest, but as a response to a call. Something obliges me. I don’t 
first choose respect; respect first calls me – it calls me back from my everyday 
involvements in a pregiven world in order to take heed. My choice lies in heeding 
the call rather than in choosing to be respectful out of a self-satisfied good 
conscience. Hence the TRC is appropriately framed in terms of a normative call.4 
That call is situated in terms of the truth of a historical context governing the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Put less 
anonymously, it is a call to me as a white male settler. In this case, however, to 
what am I called back? At an empirical level, I’m called back to look squarely at 
the truth of the history of colonialism in Canada and to publicly acknowledge it. 
At an ontological level, however, I’m called back to the truth of an experience of 
being that is other than the European experience of white settlers.  
WHAT IS “ONTOLOGY”? 
Although traditionally relegated to philosophy in its pursuit of questions about 
the meaning of being or existence, in the latter half of the 20th century the word 
“ontology” gained greater currency in other fields.5 There has been a purported 
 
within a suspension (epochē) of one’s own cultural baggage in order to allow modes of worlding (in a sense 
to be explained) with which one is not familiar to be manifest as free as possible of one’s own cultural 
framings. As I see it, this approach neither forecloses nor competes with transculturalism. However, my 
worry about transculturalism alone, without something like the “intercultural epochē” defended here, is 
that in an intercultural exchange in which unequal power relations are at play, as is the case in relations 
between colonizer heirs and colonized peoples, any newly evolved cultural meanings may bear the imprint 
of that colonization and wind up privileging Western concepts and categories. I think that this has certainly 
been the case with concepts like “worldview” (which will be discussed below). On the other hand, cross-
cultural exchanges have often proven to be catalysts for the creation of new cultural works and meanings. 
In my view, however, such transculturalist evolution would only be strengthened and kept respectful by the 
intercultural epochē. But the development of this argument would take us beyond the scope of this essay, 
which will be limited to the Heideggerian hermeneutic approach that informs the intercultural epochē. 
4 Truth and Reconciliation  Commission of Canada: Calls to Action 
 (http://nctr.ca/assets/reports/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf) [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. Of particular 
relevance to this essay is call 62ii.  
5 See Busse et. al., ‘Actually, What Does “Ontology” Mean? A Term Coined by Philosophy in the Light of 
Different Scientific Disciplines’. Journal of Computing and Information Technology – CIT 23, 1, 29–41. (2015). 
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“ontological turn” in the social sciences.6 In sociology “social ontology” refers to 
the nature or “being” of social reality.7 In computer science, according to the 
website Technopedia, “ontology” refers to “a framework for defining the domain 
that consists of a set of concepts, characteristics and relationships.”8 A “business 
process” ontology “defines the terms and concepts (meaning) used to describe 
and represent an area of knowledge, as well as relations among them.”9 The 
learning outcomes of a nursing course at my home institution includes the ability 
to “analyze ontological, epistemological, and methodological implications of 
various paradigms of nursing knowledge and ways of knowing” and to 
“demonstrate a critical understanding of how evidence is constructed and 
knowledge legitimized in differing worldviews,” and the course assignments 
include the essay topic: “My View of the Ontological Dimension of Nursing.”10  
It is not entirely clear exactly what is meant by the word “ontology” in these 
instances or if there is a common thread holding them together, but the fact that 
it is intimately bound up with ideas like “knowledge,” “worldview” and 
“viewpoint” invites caution. Closely associating ontology with knowledge 
encourages its conflation with epistemology and misleadingly implies that it has 
to do with concepts in our heads referring to something out there in the world, 
and hence to one’s overall “viewpoint” about things in general. When it is 
historicized, ontology is perhaps most often conflated with the concept of 
“worldview,”11 but these should be clearly distinguished because the very idea of 
a worldview already assumes a certain specific ontology, namely, the well-known 
Cartesian metaphysics that centralizes the subject as the “I” viewpoint or 
thinking-perceiving consciousness who “has” a worldview and projects that view 
upon an external spatiotemporal realm. Through the notion of worldview, 
 
6 See A. Escobar, ‘The “Ontological Turn” in Social Theory: A Commentary on “Human Geography 
Without Scale,” by Sallie Marston, John Paul Jones II and Keith Woodward’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 32(1), 2007, pp. 106–111. 
7 Joseph Gittler, ‘Social Ontology and the Criteria for Definitions in Sociology’, Sociometry, Vol. 14, No. 4, 
pp. 355-365. 
8 https://www.techopedia.com/definition/591/computer-ontology [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
9 https://www.bptrends.com/publicationfiles/09-03%20WP%20BP%20Ontologies%20FAQ%20Jenz.pdf 
[accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
10 http://www.athabascau.ca/syllabi/nurs/nurs608.php [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
11 For an example of such conflation in the field of education, see https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-
importance-of-the-study-of-ontology-in-education [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
 WENDELL KISNER 353 
 
Cartesian metaphysics gets a cultural facelift and becomes the viewpoint, not of 
an individual consciousness, but of an entire culture. Such culturalization or 
historicization disperses the individualist bias but still retains the same 
metaphysical assumption of a subjectivity (now an intersubjectivity) that holds a 
“view” of things out there in the world, thereby also reinvoking a classic Western 
dualism that predates the modern idea of subjectivity: the presumed opposition 
between nature and society. But there is a specifically modern twist to this.  
By suspending the naïve assumption that the world simply presents itself in a 
worldview, and by tracing how being (ontology) came to be understood as 
accessible only through a representational thinking that places its objects before 
itself, such an understanding begins to appear, not as self-evident reality, but as 
an imposition brought about by a specifically European way of being-in-the-world. 
Already framed in terms of constraint in the eighteenth century, Kant had 
asserted that the early modern scientists of Europe “learned that reason has 
insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and that it must 
not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature’s leading-strings, but must itself 
show the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining 
nature to give answer to questions of reason’s own determining.”12  
Hence the modern European twist, as Heidegger argued, is that subjectivity 
places the whole of existence before itself in representation. Such representation is 
therefore also a production carried out by a “representing-producing humanity” 
that sets the whole of what is before itself in a kind of “world picture.” “Whenever 
we have a world picture,” Heidegger asserts, “an essential decision occurs 
concerning beings as a whole. The being of beings is sought and found in the 
representedness of beings.”13 Because the world is brought before human 
subjectivity in representation, “[A]s soon as the world becomes picture the 
position of man is conceived as world view.”14 This is not limited to a cognitivist 
understanding of human subjectivity as a disinterested theoretical gaze 
contemplating the objects placed before it – it also entails any understanding of 
 
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1929), p. 20. 
13 Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track (a translation of Holzwege), trans. J. Young and K. Haynes, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 67-8.  
14 Ibid., p. 70. 
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being that makes human subjectivity, however conceived, the “primary center of 
reference.” Therefore speaking of pre-modern civilizations in terms of 
worldviews, e.g. the “Greek worldview” as opposed to the “Medieval worldview,” 
is necessarily a naïveté that uncritically interprets previous eras of history in 
modern European terms. Heidegger sums up the impositional character of the 
modernist European experience of being as worldview by asserting that the 
“collective image of representing production” bound up with conquest is the 
“fundamental event of modernity.”15 
It is this position in which modern European humanity understands itself as 
a subjectivity providing the measure for what counts as real, valuable, important, 
etc., that “secures, organizes, and articulates itself as world view.”16 Hence the 
securing, organization, and articulation of the “collective image of representing 
production” in a worldview belongs to a conquest which, in its contemporary 
global form, has been shifted onto a different register. The Earth is no longer a 
vast terrain of “uncharted” territory to be explored and exploited by a European 
humanity while the Indigenous people who exist on that territory count as merely 
non-existent or expendable. No geographical territory remains to be charted by 
colonialist desire. In place of earth and land, we now have the globe populated 
by multiple cultures and peoples, each with their own unique and equally 
valuable worldview that should be “respected,” which means placed alongside 
other worldviews in a vast egalitarian registry in which the European worldview 
accepts its place as one global citizen among others. But what gets overlooked in 
such egalitarian presumption is that, insofar as the registry itself already belongs 
to the collective image of representing-production, it merely constitutes a 
subsequent stage of cognitive conquest.17  
It matters little if the attempt is made to assert the “incommensurability” of 
worldviews. A grand registry that frames all possible ways of being-in-the-world 
as worldview and imposes that framework in advance is still tacitly posited. As 
 
15 Ibid., p. 71. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Insofar as this analysis addresses the ontological level, individual attitudes are not relevant. Hence 
changing one’s attitude is only an epiphenomenal alteration in a subject still placed as the “primary center 
of reference,” and hence also well-intentioned efforts by settlers to overcome colonialist oppression can 
unwittingly fall into this cul-de-sac.  
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Heidegger puts it, because the collective position of representing-production that 
has emerged out of Europe is articulated in terms of worldview, “the decisive 
unfolding of the modern relationship to beings becomes a confrontation of world 
views.”18 Hence when Leroy Little Bear attempts to give expression to the 
confrontation of the world of settlers with that of Indigenous peoples as one of 
“jagged worldviews colliding,”19 he inadvertently places the Indigenous world 
within the modernist framework of global European conquest. Similarly, few 
would contest Sarah Hunt’s assertion that colonialism “has involved the 
imposition of Western worldviews and the simultaneous suppression of 
Indigenous worldviews,” a claim leading immediately to the kind of seemingly 
self-evident question one often hears in various forms with respect to the 
academic disciplines (in this case that of geography): “And how might Indigenous 
geographic knowledge, or knowledge rooted in Indigenous worldviews, be 
situated in relation to the discipline of geography and its hegemonic ontologies?” 
Thus she further asks how we can “avoid being agents of assimilation when it 
comes to Indigenous knowledge, people and communities,” as if invoking 
“worldview” and “representation” has not already turned us into assimilating 
agents before the question is even raised.20 
That a collective image of representing-production is not the only possibility, 
however, is indicated when Heidegger suggests that wherever “beings are not 
interpreted in this way, the world, too, cannot come into the picture – there can 
be no world picture.”21 The door is only left open to other possibilities as a bare 
suggestion: Heidegger’s primary concern was the West and how it might free itself 
from an ontological encroachment threatening to alienate human existence from 
its own vocation of active participation in the disclosure of being. My concern 
here, however, is not with the salvation of the West but rather with a kind of 
“suspension” of the West that would allow Indigenous worlds to come to language 
in their own terms (more on this below). To casually speak of an “Indigenous 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Leroy Little Bear, ‘Jagged Worldviews Colliding’, in Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision, ed. M. Battiste, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, 2000, pp. 77-85. 
20 Sarah Hunt, ‘Ontologies of Indigeneity: the politics of embodying a concept’, cultural geographies, Vol 21(1), 
2014, pp. 29-30. 
21 Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, p. 68. 
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worldview,” however, is to already foreclose other possibilities, circumscribing a 
non-European reality within a distinctly modern European enclosure. It is 
already to make “an essential decision” about “beings as a whole” and hence also 
about Indigenous peoples. Indeed, this may be the primary ideological gesture of 
Eurocentrism today. At the very least, we should be able to see from this that 
“ontology” is not equivalent to “worldview” precisely because the very idea of a 
worldview already presupposes a very specific, modern European, ontology.  
Hence the problematic and loose usage of the concept of “worldview” is 
particularly egregious when applied to Indigenous peoples. The most cursory 
review of the literature on Indigeneity shows a remarkably pervasive and 
uncritical usage of the word, both by Indigenous as well as non-Indigenous 
writers. The problem, as Heidegger suggests, is not merely the use of a less-than-
ideal word that we might just replace with something else. Rather, the problem 
is a certain European experience of being that makes such terminology appear 
to be obvious and self-evident to all parties involved, including Indigenous writers 
themselves. The kind of experience of being to which Heidegger calls our critical 
attention is not just a cognitive “perspective” or theoretical position, but is 
affective before cognitive and embodies an entire manner and way of the being-
in-the-world of a society and culture. Hence the problem is the metaphysical 
baggage carried along with the framework of such thinking and being, a 
framework whose legible indicator is “worldview,” like the dog-whistle tip of a 
massive colonialist iceberg.  
At its extreme, understanding the human relation to the world in terms of 
“worldviews” leads us to a kind of culturalist idealism in which we can’t say 
anything about objective reality since that reality has always already been filtered 
through the tinted lens of one’s own culture. Such cultural relativism sets up a 
false dichotomy between either absolute unattainable knowledge unblemished by 
one’s own culture and history or a culturally embedded “knowledge” that is only 
validated within its own practice, a kind of Wittgensteinian “language game,” as 
it were, played out on the terrain of epistemology.22 On the other hand, if we 
 
22 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, for instance, sets up a similar foil for the “validation” of what he calls the 
“epistemologies of the South” - see The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2018, pp. 37ff. 
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adopt the so called “realist” assumption that there is an objective reality, but that 
different “ways of knowing” can contribute to our understanding of what that 
reality looks like, we’re still operating within the metaphysical assumption of a 
subjectivity set over and against a reality that we’re all trying to describe, albeit 
in various differing and equally valuable ways. Of course, the well-known 
problem faced by relativists is self-refutation: the claim that all knowledge is 
relative to one’s culture (or history, language, etc.) either tacitly presumes to stand 
outside the culture (or history, language, etc.) in which it is asserted, in which case 
it refutes itself, or it loses its own presumption to universality, in which case it 
refutes itself. As Hegel demonstrated, the more one tries to reject universality, the 
more one runs headlong into it.23  
Of particular interest with respect to the “ontological turn” mentioned above 
is Mario Blaser, who advocates “political ontology” as an alternative to the 
uncritical ontological assumption in classic anthropology of a single objective 
reality refracted through multiple cultural lenses.24 Given the prevalence of the 
latter assumption, it is unsurprising that the concept of “worldview” has gained 
traction in academic as well as popular discourse. Against this, Blaser raises the 
possibility of “ontological conflicts” which, in order to be considered, requires 
calling into question assumptions such as the idea that “the cultural differences 
that exist are between perspectives on one single reality ‘out there’…”25 He 
suggests a “political ontology” according to which multiple ontological realities 
are produced by cultural practices. Thus he claims that “ontology is a way of 
worlding, a form of enacting a reality.”26 Such multiple ontological realities he 
calls “worldings,” a term that proves useful for my purposes in this essay. Careful 
attention to ontology, then, is a way of taking difference seriously, as opposed to 
turning it into a merely epiphenomenal feature of a single presumed ontological 
 
23 See the treatment of “sense-certainty” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  
24 See Mario Blaser, ‘Ontological Conflicts and the Stories of Peoples in Spite of Europe: Toward a 
Conversation on Political Ontology’, Current Anthropology, Vol 54(5), 2013, pp. 547-568, and, ‘Ontology and 
Indigeneity: On the political ontology of heterogeneous assemblages’, Cultural Geographies, Vol 21(1), 2014, 
pp. 49-58. 
25 Blaser, ‘Ontological Conflicts’, p. 548. 
26 Ibid., p. 551. 
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reality.27 
One obvious objection is that such a “pluriverse” of multiple ontologies is 
merely the same old social constructivism again, extending “culture” all the way 
down into “ontology” and thereby making the latter just another word for the 
former. One way Blaser might be said to have countered this charge, even if he 
doesn’t explicitly invoke constructivism in this context, is with the example of 
Annemarie Mol’s work, according to which “atherosclerosis emerges as a 
different entity depending on the practice under consideration,” supporting, in 
his view, “the key point” that “in practice, atherosclerosis (or reality) is multiple 
because there are multiple practices. This is ontological multiplicity.” The idea 
that there is a single objective reality of which these various “different entities” 
are manifestations is, for him, simply another enacted practice or “story.” 
However, he admits that “the assumption of singularity is crucial to the very 
practices” that yielded a multiplicity in the first place. So the one story of 
singularity makes possible the other stories of different emergent phenomena, 
underlining his claim that ontology is something that is enacted.28  
But there is an ambiguity here as to the ontological status of the phenomenon 
in question. If Blaser denies that there is a reality to atherosclerosis that we do not 
simply “enact” with our various “storied performatives” about it, then it seems 
he falls into constructivism and it’s difficult to tell why we should prefer the term 
“ontology” to “culture” (assuming we are not committed to understanding 
“culture” in the classic sense of various interpretations of one reality, which is 
what constructivism, at least in its strong form, rejects). On the other hand, if he 
admits that there is a reality to atherosclerosis irrespective of our storied 
enactments – e.g. that people can become sick and die from it when undiagnosed 
and untreated (recalling Alan Sokal’s rebuke to postmodern pretensions) – then 
he’s back to the one reality he wanted to avoid.  
At least some of the difficulties encountered by Blaser’s approach, it seems to 
me, are brought about by his retention of an unexamined ontological assumption 
in his very critique of the assumption of a single reality “out there” with respect to 
which there are multiple cultural interpretations. In other words, the weight of 
 
27 Ibid., p. 550 (citing Matt Candea). 
28 Ibid., p. 552; see also ‘Ontology and Indigeneity’, p. 54. 
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his critique focuses upon the assumption of one reality as opposed to the 
assumption of a reality that is simply “there,” present in some way. Hence he 
opposes a pluriverse to the assumption of a single universe, but he doesn’t 
critically examine the way the universe he rejects is assumed to be present (or, 
indeed, of the way the pluriverse he embraces is present), and hence he 
inadvertently leaves an ontological assumption intact to surreptitiously frame his 
entire discourse. That ontological assumption is what Heidegger early on called 
“objective presence” (Vorhandenheit), namely, the assumption that “being” names 
what is merely present, “there” as a bare existence which may be characterized 
in terms of various properties or features.29 Blaser works hard to avoid making 
commitments to “ontology as a statement of facts,”30 thereby assuming that the 
only thing an ontological commitment could possibly be is a “statement of facts” – 
that is, a statement about objective presence. He claims that “in contrast with 
other modalities of critique or analysis, political ontology is not concerned with a 
supposedly external and independent reality (to be uncovered or depicted 
accurately),” as if such objective presence is the only ontological alternative. It is 
the ontology of objective presence that underpins the metaphysical assumption 
of an objective reality observable by a subjective consciousness, indexable as a set 
of “facts,” and that is taken up into the representation of the world as worldview. 
However, whether what is considered to be objectively present happens to be a 
universe or a pluriverse has no bearing on the ontological assumption of objective 
presence pe se insofar as both can equally be understood in those terms.  
To be sure, he offers a caveat in that “the pluriverse is a heuristic proposition, 
a foundationless foundational claim, which in the context of the previous 
discussion, means that it is an experiment on bringing itself into being.”31 But in 
his critique of the idea that ontology is merely “a heuristic device, a tool to rethink 
our analytical concepts,” he argues that “what is not self-evident is why rethinking 
 
29 It’s a pity that Blaser was deterred from engaging with Heidegger by the latter’s early use of the term 
“fundamental” in “fundamental ontology” (‘Ontology and Indigeneity’, p. 53), as the phenomenological 
clarity that could be gained from Heidegger’s work with respect to ontological questions might have also 
helped clarify Blaser’s own notion of “worldings.” As any familiarity with Heidegger’s oeuvre will quickly 
show, not only was such a fundament never found, but it soon collapsed into a groundless abyss.   
30 Blaser, ‘Ontological Conflicts’, p. 551. 
31 Blaser, ‘Ontological Conflicts’, p. 552; ‘Ontology and Indigeneity’, p. 55. 
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our analytical concepts is something that should be pursued”32 – an important 
question to raise as it brings into view the questionable horizon within which all 
such implicitly normative demands are made. However, he neglects to ask the 
same question here: why is bringing the pluriverse into being something that 
should be pursued? He cannot lay claim to the attempt to determine the true 
nature of reality (i.e. by claiming that reality – or ontology – is really multiple) 
without falling into the trap he has set for himself by thereby assuming an 
ontological reality of some sort.  
Laudably, Blaser does take his approach to mean that we should “avoid the 
assumption that reality is ‘out there’ and that ‘in here’ (the mind), we have more 
or less accurate cultural representations of it.”33 However, it is difficult to avoid 
the impression that he makes the very kind of ontological commitment he wishes 
to avoid when he immediately adds that “reality is always in the making through 
the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages that only after the fact are purified 
by moderns as pertaining to either nature or culture.”34 To say that reality is in 
the making through multiple enactments doesn’t get one off the ontological hook 
insofar as it is still, after all, a claim about what reality is like. On the other hand, 
if there is no ontological imperative that addresses us from something we do not 
merely enact or perform, the question remains: why is bringing the pluriverse 
into being something that should be pursued? Perhaps there is a normative 
presupposition lurking behind the imperative to enact a pluriverse, but Blaser 
doesn’t seem to offer any explicitly normative arguments.  
Blaser attempts to address the problem of implicit ontological commitments 
by asserting that “the claim of the pluriverse (or multiple ontologies) is not 
concerned with presenting itself as a more ‘accurate’ picture of how things are ‘in 
reality’ (a sort of meta-ontology); it is concerned with the possibilities that this 
claim may open to address emergent (and urgent) intellectual/political 
problems.” However, he attempts to situate his political ontology “at the interstice 
between the possible and the plausible that the foundationless foundational claim 
 
32 Blaser, ‘Ontological Conflicts’, p. 551; the question is repeated on page 566.  
33 Ibid., p. 551-2.   
34 Ibid., p. 552. 
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of a pluriverse opens.”35 Notwithstanding his attempt to rescue the idea of 
plausibility from “accuracy” by associating it instead with “efficacy,” surely some 
kind of reference to “reality” is unavoidable in order to make a meaningful 
distinction between what is “plausible” and what isn’t. Furthermore, since the 
word “plausible” has been associated with truth since at least the 16th century, the 
attempt to tie it exclusively to efficacy is dubious. At best this reflects an 
unconvincing bias toward pragmatism and at worst an attempt to redefine the 
word in order to fit a predetermined theory.36  
And finally, the purported connection of efficacy to plausibility is itself said to 
be “just another way of referring to the actual environment that has been brought 
into being from the infinite possibilities of the pluriverse,” which not only brings 
us right back to a purportedly “factual” claim about an “actual environment” 
(casual reference to the “actual” often signals the assumption of objective 
presence), but stakes its claim that political ontology entails no meta-ontological 
commitments on the assumption that the pluriverse, which is what is at issue, is 
what has brought into being an actual environment in which efficacy is connected to 
plausibility, which is supposed to rescue the pluriverse from meta-ontological 
commitments. So the connection of political ontology to efficacy purportedly 
rescues it from making truth claims about the world, and efficacy in turn connects 
it to plausibility, a connection said to be grounded in the pluriverse which brought 
it into being. In other words, the very claim that political ontology entails no 
ontological commitments is itself based upon an ontological commitment to the 
claim that the pluriverse has brought something into being.  
Despite his admirable efforts to the contrary, Blaser leaves us in the quandary 
of perpetually running into ontological assumptions in the very attempts to avoid 
them. It seems to me that, rather than beginning from a normatively ambiguous 
imperative to bring a pluriverse into being, a similar effort might be better served 
by first suspending the ontological assumptions that have grown out of the 
 
35 Ibid., p. 554.  
36 On the other hand, if Blaser intends to bring us back to the earlier meaning of the Latin plausibilis, 
“deserving applause, acceptable” (Online Etymology Dictionary), then it is no more connected to “efficacy” 
than it is to anything else that might be deserving of applause.  
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European experience of the world, as Blaser begins to do,37 but without 
immediately positing anything about multiple ontologies. The methodology of 
such suspension is the phenomenological epochē, to be discussed further below. 
As a subtractive methodology, it doesn’t begin with a big picture of multiple 
ontologies, whether this picture be theorized or enacted (or theorized as enacted, 
which is what Blaser’s account does). Rather, in suspending theoretical 
assumptions it doesn’t first seek a big picture. Instead, it first limits itself to the 
phenomenon at issue, whatever that may be. It can only proceed piecemeal, as it 
were, much as Heidegger had to begin with that being that lies closest – one’s 
own existence as a concrete “being-there” (Dasein) – and through 
phenomenological analysis discovering the historical, and therefore also 
European, character of that being. Hence it was always an open question as to 
whether, and if so in what ways, the phenomenological ontology Heidegger 
carried out in Being and Time might be relevant to non-European modes of 
existence. As Martin Holbraad remarks in his response to Blaser, “What is 
ontology is itself an ontological question—a virtuous circularity that keeps 
anthropological horizons open”38 (I would only subtract the qualifier 
“anthropological”). Hence it cannot begin as a project to either purify difference 
of sameness, to discover sameness behind difference, or to bring a pluriverse into 
being – even if the latter winds up being one of its effects. 
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE MODERNIST ERA 
Now although the Western European subject-object paradigm is well-known and 
has been thoroughly criticized in multiple ways, Heidegger did not take it to 
define the genuine experience of being that belongs to European modernity. Such 
subject-object dualism, a cogito set over and against a realm of spatial extension 
or, more colloquially, consciousness confronting a world of objects, is already an 
abstraction that we don’t generally experience as such. We do not just exist 
indifferently alongside other objects “in” a world that contains us. When we 
engage in such theoretical abstractions, we’ve already left behind the world as we 
 
37 As pointed out by Anders Burman in his response, Blaser follows many others in this – ‘Ontological 
Conflicts’, p. 561. 
38 Ibid., p. 563. 
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really experience it, and it was Heidegger’s early claim in Being and Time that 
human beings always already live and act within an implicit pre-reflective 
understanding of “being” that is primarily given through affect, worldly know-
how, and talking with others.  
The representational character of modern European thought itself testifies to 
an active involvement that brings about validity and knowledge through the 
production of representation. But that drive toward knowing the world in 
Baconian power ultimately turns back upon the subjectivity that was its presumed 
initiator, only to reveal such subjectivity as itself swallowed up in a subjectless 
“placing before” with no one “before” whom it is placed. This is the error 
committed by those who assume that suspending Cartesian metaphysics is 
sufficient to ward of the interference of Western assumptions – they’ve merely 
suspended what was already a theoretical abstraction without digging down to a 
more pervasive experience of being-in-the-world. Ironically, the view of Western 
existence as something framed by the subject/object ontological paradigm itself 
belongs to the representational thinking that places the real before itself in 
representation. Or, to put it more simply, this kind of critique remains at the 
theoretical level and so neglects stepping back to a critique of the very theoria of 
theoretical representation as itself an abstraction from an experience of being that 
cannot be adequately understood in those terms.  
Rather than simply adopting an understanding of ontology from the readily 
available options given in the Western philosophical tradition, Heidegger 
proposed to clarify ontology through phenomenology – that is, by letting “what 
is” show itself on its own terms, as it were. This entails the phenomenological 
“epochē” or suspension of one’s own assumptions and presuppositions in order to 
let the matter of inquiry be manifest in its own terms, which in turn requires a 
critical awareness of what those assumptions and presuppositions are.39 Hence 
 
39 Heideggerian “hermeneutic” phenomenology is often distinguished from Husserlian “descriptive” 
phenomenology in that, whereas the latter requires the suspension of presuppositions, the former recognizes 
the impossibility of such a requirement, and instead asserts the necessity of entering into one’s 
presuppositions in a certain way. However, I hold that suspension (the epochē) is equally necessary in 
Heideggerian phenomenology, and so anchoring the difference between Heidegger and Husserl upon these 
descriptors is misleading. We only gain insight into what must be suspended by way of a careful examination 
of our presuppositions in light of the way phenomena show themselves, and hence what saves the 
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the epochē is key, an argument I will elucidate and develop below. Even though 
Heidegger himself abandoned this Husserlian term, the suspension named by it 
is nonetheless operative in his approach to letting a matter of inquiry show itself 
on its own terms. The entire argument of his magnum opus Being and Time, for 
instance, is carried out within a rigorous suspension of the ontology of objective 
presence (Vorhandenheit), that is, the assumption that “to be” means to “be present,” 
actually or potentially, to a consciousness or awareness that can in turn observe 
such being-present and specify its properties, an assumption whose most explicit 
form can be seen in Descartes.  
Scant research has been done on the possible relevance of Heideggerian 
thought to Indigenous/settler relations or to the project of decolonization. A 
notable exception is Nelson Maldonado-Torres who, following Heidegger’s early 
thought in Being and Time, attempts to develop the “being of coloniality” as an 
explicit theme.40 Although I find useful his distinction, adopted in this essay, 
between “colonialism” as a historical event and “coloniality” as the systemic 
cognitive and experiential legacy of that event in post-colonial societies, I also 
find that, because the epochē is not rigorously deployed, his otherwise admirable 
attempt to bring Heideggerian thought into connection with the project of 
decolonization falls short of its potential.  
For instance, not only does he seem to conflate chronological priority with 
ontological priority in an attempt to assert an ego defined through conquest ( “ego 
conquiro”41) as constitutive ground of the Cartesian ego cogito simply because the 
former predated the latter,42 but he also conflates Heideggerian and Cartesian 
ontologies as well. When he concludes that, because “Heidegger’s ontological 
turn missed” what he believes to be the Cartesian suppression of coloniality, 
“Cartesian epistemology and Heideggerian ontology presuppose the coloniality 
 
“hermeneutical circle” from vicious circularity is the manifestation of phenomena as the measure to which 
phenomenological analysis submits.  
40 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ‘On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the development of a concept, 
Cultural Studies, Vol 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007, 240-270. 
41 The term ego conquiro is taken from the work of Enrique Dussel. Although it seems apparent that 
Maldonado-Torres misunderstands Descartes in positing a desire to exclude the rationality of certain 
(colonized) other minds in the cogito, which contains no reference to other minds at all (colonized or not), it 
is not my purpose here to defend Cartesian thought but rather to suspend it.  
42 Maldonado-Torres, ‘On the Coloniality of Being, p. 245) 
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of knowledge and the coloniality of Being,”43 he mistakenly attributes assumptions 
to Heidegger merely because he (unconvincingly) attributes the same assumptions 
to Descartes. Therefore, by neglecting to suspend Cartesian ontology, 
Maldonado-Torres ends up overlooking what is unique about Heidegger’s 
understanding of being-in-the-world, with respect to which Cartesian ontology is 
simply irrelevant. Hence his interpretation is based upon two errors: the 
assumption that Cartesian ontology presupposes coloniality and that Heidegger 
in turn presupposes Cartesian ontology. He thereby overlooks the suspension of 
Cartesian ontology within which the entire argument of Being and Time transpires, 
and so provides us with a salient example of the pitfalls of neglecting the epochē 
in the project of decolonization.  
In this case, beyond a merely academic concern about accurate 
interpretations of western philosophers, it means that Maldonado-Torres’ attempt 
to think the coloniality of being fails to think at a properly ontological level at all, 
and winds up merely exhausting its critical force at the “ontic” level. Even though 
Maldonado-Torres explicitly invokes Heidegger’s notion of the ontological 
difference which “allows one to think clearly about Being and not to confuse it 
with beings or entities or God,”44 that difference is immediately collapsed into a 
difference between different beings: the colonizer and the colonized. In other 
words, the ontological difference is that between particular beings and the way 
those beings are manifest, as distinct from an “ontic” difference between 
particular beings (e.g. the difference between cats and dogs, tables and chairs, 
doctors and lawyers, etc.). The only kind of difference I see in what Maldonado-
Torres calls the “colonial difference” between colonizer and colonized is an ontic 
difference that is no more “ontological” than the difference between any other 
two types of beings in the world.45  
That in itself could be regarded as an innocent oversight that only a few 
philosophy professors might worry about, were it not for the fact that the 
 
43 Ibid., p. 252. 
44 Ibid., p. 254. 
45 This is not to say, however, that there may not be ontological differences between different worldings, in 
Blaser’s sense of that term. But multiple worldings is hardly something that can be captured in an ontic 
colonizer/colonized binary.  
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“colonial difference” between colonizer and colonized that operates along the 
axis of superiority/inferiority – or, as Maldonado-Torres puts it, a “difference 
between Being and what lies below Being or that which is negatively marked as 
dispensable as well as a target of rape and murder”46 – is an ontologically illegitimate 
one: it’s a difference that isn't. Because it is a semblance of difference imposed by 
colonizers upon the colonized, the last thing we need to do is ontologize it. We 
want to suspend it, to put it out of commission – not assign it to an ontological level. 
The problem is that this way of approaching coloniality may inadvertently 
reconstruct the “damage centered” approach that Eve Tuck has thematized: a 
“pathologizing approach in which the oppression singularly defines a 
community.” She primarily has in view the kind of social science research that 
aims “to document pain or loss in an individual, community, or tribe,” and that 
“looks to historical exploitation, domination, and colonization to explain 
contemporary brokenness, such as poverty, poor health, and low literacy.”47 
Hence it is well-intentioned and necessary even if problematic. However, 
elevating such brokenness and oppression to the ontological level risks rendering 
it even more intractable. Interestingly, Tuck calls for the “suspension” of such 
approaches, implying the necessity of an epochē of sorts without explicitly 
naming it as such.48  
If the epochē were explicitly practiced, we need not go down the “damage 
centered” rabbit hole. The problem is that, through neglect of the epochē and 
the consequent failure to think at an ontological level, a semblance of difference 
at the ontic level get “ontologized” and thereby inadvertently reinforced by being 
placed outside of human agency, which is especially problematic with respect to 
Indigenous/settler and colonized/colonizer differences. The point is not to deny 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Eve Tuck, ‘Suspending damage: A letter to communities’, Harvard Educational Review 79(3), 2009: 409-27., 
p. 413. See also Chandler/Reid’s critique of the notion of Indigenous “resilience” as something “being 
deployed to valorize disempowering conceptions of subjectivity” (D. Chandler & J. Reid, ‘“Being in Being”: 
Contesting the ontopolitics of Indigeneity’, The European Legacy, 23:3, 251-268., p. 263). 
48 I would also argue that the “desire-based research framework” she offers in place of damage-centered 
research would fare better under the epochē explicitly practiced. Any attempt to depathologize “the 
experiences of dispossessed and disenfranchised communities so that people are seen as more than broken 
and conquered” would benefit from explicitly suspending the conceptual and affective framings that bring 
them to appear as nothing more than broken, conquered, and oppressed.  
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real differences. Rather, the point is to suspend all ontological assumptions along 
with the differences they presuppose in the epochē, only thereby hoping to catch 
sight of what might be manifest on its own terms. If there are differences at the 
ontological level, they will only become manifest through the epochē. Otherwise 
we risk merely reinstating semblance rather than truth, an ontological concern, 
and pathologizing entire peoples, an ethical concern.  
Hence unlike Maldonado-Torres, what I draw from Heidegger is not a 
departure point for conceiving the colonized experience of being, but rather an 
intercultural methodology defined by the epochē, a methodology that is 
subtractive rather than additive. That is, I make no attempt to conceive of 
colonized or Indigenous ways of experiencing being since, as I will argue below, 
the epochē is a necessary condition for any such attempt.  
THE HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 
When Heidegger turns to a phenomenological examination of what the 
ontological framework guiding European modernity looks like, the first 
assumption to be suspended in the epochē is that of Cartesian metaphysics. But 
the phenomenon that thrusts itself into the foreground in any attempt to 
understand the modern world is technology. Hence the inquiry into modernity 
suggests an inquiry into the essence of modern technology. For Heidegger, 
“essence” refers not to an abstract universal but rather to the way a phenomenon 
appears when it is allowed to show itself in its own terms, that is, 
phenomenologically. It’s a way of appearing or a manner of emergence, rather than 
something that appears or emerges, and is not to be confused with the classic 
metaphysical notion of a universal “essence” behind appearances.49 Thought 
phenomenologically, “essence” is the way something appears as the phenomenon 
it most properly is, on its own terms. Hence the essence of technology is not to be 
confused with technological artifacts. In fact, the “essence” of modern technology 
on Heidegger’s account turns out not to be anything technological at all – a point 
sorely misunderstood by critics who immediately assume that Heidegger is anti-
technological. Rather, the essence of modern technology, on Heidegger’s 
 
49 “Essence” is a translation of the German word Wesen: see Heidegger’s discussion of this term and what 
he took to be the danger facing modern humanity in the essay ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (in 
Basic Writings, ed. David Krell, London, Harper Perennial, 2008, pp. 311-341).  
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account, is a certain way in which phenomena are manifest in the modern world.  
An everyday assumption we tend to make about modern technology is that it 
is merely a means to an end that is created by human beings – an assumption 
Heidegger calls the “instrumental/anthropological” model of technology.50 
When we see ancient and modern technologies as being essentially the same 
except that one is more efficient and advanced, we primarily have such an 
instrumental/anthropological model in view. This model also predominates 
when we see technology as something that’s in itself neutral but which can be 
used for good or bad purposes. Heidegger proposes that we suspend this 
instrumental/anthropological assumption as well, but he also thinks we may get 
somewhere by asking what a “means” to an “end” is in the first place.  
Insofar as a means brings about an end, it assumes a notion of causality that 
Heidegger traces back to its Greek origins in the word aitia, which means that 
which enables something to be. Enabling to be brings something into 
manifestation, leading us to think of the essence of technology as a way of letting 
appear or a “way of revealing.”51 Similarly, we can trace the word “technology” 
itself back to its Greek origin in the word techne, which means bringing something 
about through craft or knowledgeable skill and was contrasted with phusis, usually 
translated as “nature,” which referred to something emerging into existence 
spontaneously of itself. Together, these two modes of bringing forth into 
manifestation belong within the wider notion of poiesis, which is “bringing forth 
into manifestation” per se. The point is that, once again, we arrive at 
manifestation or revealing.52 So Heidegger takes this as a legible hint in language 
suggesting that, above and beyond technological artifacts, the essence of 
technology is a way of revealing or a mode of disclosure: it brings things to appear 
in certain ways. The question then becomes: in what way are things revealed in 
the modern era?  
One of the examples Heidegger focuses upon in response to this question is 
that of a commercial airliner, which can easily be represented as an object with 
specific properties. This representation is “correct” enough since we can verify 
 
50 Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 312.  
51 Ibid., pp. 313-318. 
52 Ibid., pp. 318-19. 
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statements about those properties but, when we fixate exclusively upon it, the way 
the phenomenon is actually manifest in the world as the commercial airliner that 
it is remains hidden from view behind the assumption of its objective presence. If 
we follow the phenomenological method by suspending our assumptions about 
what an airliner is and attend to how it actually appears, the phrase “ready for 
take-off ” seems to describe the essence of the airliner far more appropriately 
than, say, defining it as “an industrially produced mechanical object designed for 
air transportation.” The phrase “ready for take-off ” is much closer to the way 
this phenomenon is manifest in our actual experience than is an abstract 
description of its objective properties in isolation from its real-world relations – a 
description that actually abstracts it from the world in which it appears. As ready 
for take-off, the plane shows itself to be something on hand and readily available 
for use, bound up in a network of relations.53 The clue Heidegger takes from this 
is that the essence of technology as a way of revealing has something to do with 
revealing things as constantly available and on hand for ready deployment, 
calculation, extraction, and storage, like a repository of data or stock. The 
emphasis is not even on usage per se but merely upon availability. The German 
term Heidegger applies to this way of revealing is Bestand, which is usually 
translated as “standing reserve” but can also be rendered as “constant 
availability” (I will use these phrases interchangeably).54  
To take another of Heidegger’s examples, when we compare an old wooden 
water wheel set into the current of a river with a modern hydroelectric dam in 
terms of neutral instrumentality only, they both seem to be more or less the same 
kind of thing except that one is modern and efficient whereas the other is 
primitive and crude. But Heidegger suggests that the old water wheel was “built 
into” the river in such a way that it derived its essence (its manner of appearing) 
from the river. That is, the way the water wheel appears is drawn from and 
depends upon the way the river itself is manifest – it is manifest in terms of the 
river. We might say that the appearance of the water wheel is contextualized by 
 
53 Ibid., p. 322. 
54 For the association of the essence of modern technology with “total availability,” see David Kolb, The 
Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 145 
and passim. 
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the river. In the case of the hydroelectric power plant, by contrast, the river is 
“dammed up into” the power plant, and thereafter the river derives its essence 
from the power plant.55 That is, the situation is now precisely reversed: the way 
the river appears is drawn from and depends upon the way the power plant is 
manifest – it is manifest in terms of the power plant. Here we must say that the 
appearance of the river is contextualized by the power plant.  
Contextualized this way, the river is henceforth manifest as a power utility or 
resource. This now names what the river is, which means the way it appears. It is 
“challenged” in a way to be revealed as an energy source by the essence of 
technology, which is a kind of revealing that challenges. In other words, 
Heidegger finds something less than peaceful about this mode of disclosure in 
that it sets upon things in order to extract and store, a “setting upon” that shoves 
other possible ways of revealing into the background as inessential or, at worst, 
mere subjective projections. Nature becomes “natural resources,” and river 
current remains available as a utility to be taken up, stored, and sold by power 
companies. But surely the river is nonetheless a pretty sight irrespective of the 
power plant. Of course: as Heidegger puts it, it is “an object on call for inspection 
by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.”56 Even the beauty of 
nature becomes something readily available for tourists to extract and store on 
cell phones. Images of “natural attractions” will now be replicated on T-shirts, 
coffee mugs, screen savers, and social media posts.  
Insofar as this way of revealing is a kind of challenge, it’s not just a neutral 
way of seeing things but rather is a kind of demand that requires expediting, and 
which can be summed up in the phrase “maximum yield at minimum expense.”57 
In this sense “efficiency,” a word that seems so self-evident that we automatically 
give voice to it without a second thought, is a modernist criterion. Thus to merely 
say that modern technology is more efficient than earlier technologies is to read 
the earlier in terms of the later. It is to impose a modernist measure upon older 
worldings that were not responding to such a demand or criterion.  
In the revealing that holds sway throughout modernity, everything is 
 
55 Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 321. 
56 Ibid., p. 321. 
57 Ibid. 
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challenged forth and expedited so that it may be “on call” – that is, constantly 
available, on hand and ready for retrieval. Heidegger argues that, 
phenomenologically speaking, when things are revealed in this way they no 
longer merely stand over and against us as objects.58 The cyberspace network we 
daily plug ourselves into on our computers and mobile devices doesn’t primarily 
appear as an object over and against us. It can be made to appear that way only 
when we pull back from our involvements with it and adopt the perspective of a 
detached subject looking at an object – which is not how we primarily experience 
this phenomenon. What is truly manifest is no longer an “object” per se but has 
become something more like multiple interlocking networks of data or 
information that are simply on hand and extant, and in which we are caught up 
and entangled. We hook ourselves up to a prosthetic cognition/affect network in 
such a way that where “it” ends and “I” begin is a fuzzy boundary, if indeed a 
boundary exists at all outside the kind of detached reflection upon it that we’re 
engaging in right now.  
The Cartesian “subject” itself disappears into constant availability, yielding a 
subjectless network in which human beings appear as human resources and target 
markets. Social media now makes every aspect of one’s daily existence, down to 
the most trivial details, readily available and on hand for consumption. This also 
reveals that human beings do not simply preside over this way of revealing insofar 
as they find themselves equally placed under the demand to be on call and 
available, thereby showing the superficiality of the commonplace assumption that 
the essence of technology is merely a neutral human-created means to an end. 
As distance shrinks and constant point-to-point connection is assured, both 
objects and subjects disappear into a global distancelessness. But in conquering 
distance, Heidegger asks, has this way of revealing things brought anything near? 
Or has nearness been sacrificed along with distance?59  
The way of revealing that holds sway in modernity is not a “worldview” 
insofar as this would posit the human-as-subject at the basis, a subject which can 
choose to adopt a “view” of the world. It doesn't originate in the subject. Rather, 
 
58 Ibid., p. 322.  
59 Heidegger, ‘The Thing’, in Poetry Language Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter, New York, Harper Perennial, 
1971, pp. 163-164. 
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modern humanity is responding to what addresses itself to it. We are the ones 
addressed, not the other way around – we are not efficient causal agents. 
Humanity is itself challenged and ordered to exploit the energies of nature – that 
is, humanity itself is challenged and made to appear within the revealing that 
determines everything as standing-reserve. When human beings “see” nature as 
a storehouse of available information and resource, they are responding to 
something. When people are characterized as “human resources” and evaluated 
in terms of productivity and efficiency, they are standing within an experience of 
being that prevails in Western modernity and are responding to it. Such response 
takes place well before conscious awareness comes along and reflects on it. 
Heidegger will say that this response is a response to being – that is, it is a response 
to a disclosure that has come to define human existence. Human beings are not 
masters over but participants in this disclosure, a disclosure that is operative 
through one’s affect, one’s pre-objective understanding, and one’s language. Such 
disclosures or ways of revealing are the worldings in which we live, move and 
have our being. Human beings are neither active initiators nor the passive 
recipients of worldings. Rather, they participate medially. That is, worlding must 
be thought in the middle voice rather than in terms of the passive and active 
voices.60   
Heidegger also saw the Western/modernist way of revealing as a preeminent 
danger in its totalizing imposition: the demand is put to the totality of “what is” 
that it show itself in terms of standing reserve, and as that only.61 It was this sense 
 
60 It is beyond the scope of this essay to develop the middle voice with respect to worldings here, but I have 
written about the middle voice elsewhere with respect to interdisciplinarity (Kisner, W., 2017. ‘The Medial 
Character of Interdisciplinarity: Thinking in the Middle Voice’. Issues in Interdisciplinary Studies, No. 35,   pp. 
29-52.) and ecological ethics (Kisner, W., 2014. Ecological Ethics and Living Subjectivity in Hegel’s Logic: The Middle 
Voice of Autopoietic Life. London: Palgrave-Macmillan). With respect to worldings, I would argue that only by 
thinking of enactment in terms of the middle voice can we extricate ourselves from the realist/constructivist 
quandary that besets cultural studies (in particular, see my discussion of the tension between realism and 
idealism or discovery and construction in Kisner 2017, op.cit., pp. 30ff.). In the response to a way of 
revealing, it is not as if we passively respond to a worlding already present and ready-made, nor is it as if we 
actively construct worldings through our collective enactments. Thought medially, it is both at once: we 
respond to that which we enact, and enactment only takes place through such response. Worlding emerges 
through the interplay of call and response, in which the call is only manifest in the response and vice versa. 
61 With respect to standing reserve, Amazon’s “Alexa” is an interesting example – see 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/22/technology/alexa-everywhere/index.html  [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
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of total imposition that worried Heidegger, and led him to call it a “totalizing 
framework” (Gestell).62 The totalizing framework is not itself something 
technological like a cell phone, a computer, or even the Internet. Rather, these 
phenomena show themselves within the totalizing framework and in its terms. 
All technological apparatuses and activity are themselves responses to the 
totalizing framework that demands manifestation in terms of constant availability, 
while the totalizing framework is itself carried out by those responses.  
Although the totalizing framework is not a result of human choice or 
deliberate construction, it does not come to pass apart from human involvement 
either. We modern human beings always already find ourselves within the 
totalizing framework that reveals reality in terms of constant availability and 
calculability. We can never only subsequently take up a relationship to this mode 
of disclosure, as if we could first stand outside this relationship and then choose 
to enter it. Therefore, the question as to how we are to relate to the essence of 
technology “always comes too late.”63 As a being-in-the-world in which the 
“world” is the totalizing framework that reveals things in terms of constant 
availability, we have always already related to it and are always already in the 
process of doing so. But we can respond to that within which we already stand, 
and here is where the phenomenological epochē and the clarity thereby afforded 
become relevant. So long as we don't make the step back to think at an 
ontological level, which phenomenology enables us to do, we can’t even get 
started. In order to see the possibility of other modes of disclosure, we must first 
see the one we’re in.  
INDIGENIZING THE ACADEMY 
My worry about calls to “Indigenize” academia should now become clear.64 The 
 
62 I avoid the customary translation of Gestell as “enframing” because, in my view, this English word does 
not capture the impositional and totalizing character that Heidegger wants to convey.  
63 Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 329.  
64 For some recent developments in universities, see the online article ‘Indigenizing the academy’ at 
https://www.universityaffairs.ca/features/feature-article/indigenizing-the-academy/ [accessed Dec. 4, 
2019]. These efforts have taken on some urgency in response to the TRC call to action 62ii: “ Provide the 
necessary funding to post-secondary institutions to educate teachers on how to integrate Indigenous 
knowledge and teaching methods into classrooms.” 
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danger is that such “Indigenous content” will not appear in its own terms – which 
presumably would be terms radically different from those of the history of 
Western metaphysics – but rather will appear as one more repository of readily 
available data within the totality of scholarly research and knowledge. The 
totalizing character of the way of revealing just described is such that it can brook 
no mysteries – it demands that everything be rendered available and accessible. 
And this demand put to the Indigenous people who were already colonized 
bodily threatens to extend that colonization to an entire way of being on the earth 
(something we clumsily call “culture”).  
Thus it is not with hope but with trepidation that I learn of Westerners looking 
to Indigenous “resilience” in order to “help western societies cope with the 
environmental crises of the Anthropocene,” or when “the modern subject is 
encouraged to “become indigenous” based upon the purported “radical 
promise” that we can create a better world “by learning to world in the ways 
indigenous peoples already do.”65 Whereas Chandler and Reid are concerned, 
perhaps rightly, that “the figure of the indigenous, far from producing a 
decolonization of state thinking, is being deployed to valorize disempowering 
conceptions of subjectivity” as dispossessed yet “resilient,” my concern is that 
Indigenous worldings could be assimilated into a grand repository of readily 
accessible information as a “model to peoples worldwide”66 within a totalizing 
framework that submits all phenomena to the same homogenous measure of 
disclosure: constant availability on hand for potential mining. The intentions and 
purposes behind various mining efforts, regardless of how benevolent they may 
be, has no effect on this. In the context of such a totalizing framework, any 
purported “ontological” differences between worldings are again reduced to 
epiphenomenal features of the same ontological disclosure in terms of standing 
reserve, so much so that the very singular uniqueness of each is affirmed 
simultaneously with its effacement. That such purported uniqueness itself is 
precisely what gets taken up into the stockpile of readily available data indicates how 
insidious and pervasive this ontological disclosure is, and it underlines the 
 
(http://nctr.ca/assets/reports/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf - accessed Dec. 4, 2019.) 
65 Chandler and Reid, ‘Being in Being’, p. 254, 257. 
66 Ibid., p. 261.  
 WENDELL KISNER 375 
 
necessity of addressing it at the ontological level above and beyond calls for moral 
accountability and attitudinal changes.  
Already framed in terms of unification (synthesis) over difference, the 
Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) now 
offers “knowledge synthesis grants.” Under “emerging areas of research,” the 2018 
SSHRC summary report listed “Models for bridging Indigenous and Western 
knowledge systems” and “Digitization, protection and accessibility of Indigenous 
knowledge and cultural heritage.”67 The haste to “bridge” immediately carries 
with it the demand that Indigenous knowledge be made readily available through 
“digitization, protection and accessibility” – that is, that it be rendered on hand 
as standing reserve.  
As Sa'ke'j Henderson and Marie Battiste somewhat cynically put it nearly 
twenty years ago, “The rush on Indigenous knowledge systems, teachings, and 
heritage by outsiders is an effort to access, to know, and to assert control over 
these resources […] As Indigenous knowledge and heritage becomes more 
intensely attractive commercially, the cognitive heritage that gives Indigenous 
peoples their identity is under assault from those who would gather it up, strip 
away its honored meanings, convert it to a product, and sell it.”68 The 
insidiousness of the totalizing framework Heidegger attributes to modernity is 
again legible in the fact that in this very resistance to it, that framework still creeps 
back in with the characterization of “Indigenous knowledge systems, teachings, 
and heritage” as resources that must be protected from outsider control. If 
Heidegger is right, those “outsiders” are themselves responding to a way of 
revealing over which they do not preside, and to frame the problem as a struggle 
over control of resources means that both Indigene and colonizer are drawn into 
the orbit of the same mode of disclosure.  
Relevant to this problem but for very different reasons, Tuck and Yang 
advocate “an ethic of incommensurability” that foregrounds the differences 
 
67 ‘Toward a successful shared future for Canada - Research insights from the knowledge systems, 
experiences and aspirations of First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples’. https://www.sshrc-
crsh.gc.ca/society-societe/community-communite/ifca-iac/03-aboriginal_peoples_in_Canada_report-
les_peuples_autochtones_en_Canada_rapport-eng.aspx#intro_ksg [accessed Dec. 4, 2019]. 
68 Marie Battiste and Sa'ke'j Henderson, ‘Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: A Global 
Challenge’, Saskatoon, Purich Publishing Ltd., 2000, p. 12.  
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between decolonization and other social justice projects.69 They raise the 
interesting possibility of decolonization as an unknown future incommensurate 
with any known paradigms, thereby implicitly framing it as a state of exception 
in its rejection of all settler juridicality, democratic or otherwise.70 I depart from 
Tuck and Yang, however, in that I do not believe that the desire to find common 
ground is inherently a bad thing, nor do I accept the cynical view that 
reconciliation is reducible to “rescuing settler normalcy” and “rescuing a settler 
future.”71 Keeping in mind the TRC’s delimited sense of the word, reconciliation 
signifies respect. But the “looking back” in respect must also be a looking forward 
to future possibilities.72 Such futurity cannot be hastily grasped all at once and 
 
69 Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang, ‘Decolonization is not a metaphor’, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & 
Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, 1-40. 
70 For a sustained account of the state of exception with respect to both its democratic as well as totalitarian 
possibilities, see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. K. Attell, Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005. 
71 ‘Decolonization is not a metaphor’, p. 35. Although Tuck’s and Yang’s article explicitly rejects the 
assumption that “land can be owned by people” as a “colonial view of the world,” it inconsistently reasserts 
the very land ownership repudiated with the repeated demand that “stolen Native land” be “repatriated” 
(p. 24 and passim) – as if the theme of returning stolen goods can presuppose anything other than property, 
and as if those to whom stolen land is returned today would be anything other than the presumed rightful 
heirs. Sometimes the article accomplishes this feat in a single sentence, as when it states that 
decolonialization “requires the abolition of land as property and upholds the sovereignty of Native land and 
people,” as if the possessive designation “Native land” does not presuppose the very “land as property” just 
renounced (p. 26). Indeed, the more the article tries to foreclose settler concepts, the more it relies upon 
them (e.g. sovereignty, justice, property, etc.). The more it tries to purify decolonization of metaphor, the 
more it depends upon massive metaphorical extensions of colonialism. It is difficult to avoid the impression 
that the article ends up simply being reactionary, with the “re” in “repatriation” signifying the 
reconstruction of a pre-contact state rather than a move forward into something beyond property and 
landownership per se. In the wake of its collapse into inconsistency and empirical impossibility, all that 
remains is what one suspects might be the motivation behind the article in the first place: maximization of 
settler guilt. And of course there is nothing specifically decolonialist about guilt – white settlers are well 
acquainted with a long history of guilt cultivation and indeed have relished it (just read Nietzsche!), making 
the upshot of the article another strident and tired call to feel guilty, even if only for settlers. The cultivation 
of guilt, of course, is a project that history has amply shown to be impotent at bringing about progressive 
change but quite instrumental in preventing it.  
72 I realize of course that my own argument could be all-too-easily dismissed as a settler “path to innocence” 
that side-lines the decolonialist project by drawing attention elsewhere. Aside from committing the 
circumstantial variety of the ad hominem fallacy by ignoring an argument’s logic in favour of posited 
nefarious motives hastily drawn from the circumstances of its author, such dismissal itself runs the risk of 
undermining the project it advocates by the uncritical adoption of Western metaphysical concepts. I seek 
to hold open futurity by suspending such assumptions and avoiding the foreclosure of possibilities in a haste 
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cannot be determined in advance by any individual or group. Whereas Tuck and 
Yang seek to differentiate the decolonialist project from other social justice efforts 
to the degree that the latter presuppose settler values and motives, their lack of 
attention to the ontological level lead them to overlook the Western categories 
they assume in their own conception of the decolonialist project. Hence not only 
do they presuppose inexplicit normative values, but they leave both settler as well 
as Indigenous experiences of being unclarified. To that degree the decolonialist 
project as they conceive it winds up predetermined, thereby foreclosing 
possibilities that may lie outside that conception – possibilities such as 
reconciliation.  
My own purpose in this essay is not overtly decolonialist. Rather it is to clear 
the ontological ground, as it were, prior to ontic social justice projects through 
the phenomenological epochē. In that respect, again, the approach derived from 
Heideggerian phenomenological ontology, which I believe is appropriate to 
settler status, is subtractive rather than additive. Rather than assert what 
decolonialism should look like, I seek to put in abeyance assumptions that 
threaten to covertly intrude and predetermine it. And in order to do that 
successfully, those assumptions must be made explicit. It is imperative to 
recognize, however, that the project of reconciliation is fraught with risk, and in 
order to find a way forward it is incumbent upon us to be circumspect by making 
explicit the mode of revealing in which we swim like fish in water. At the 
minimum, and regardless of good settler intentions, it means we cannot assume 
that ways of life belonging to people other than us are or should be made readily 
available as information, data, resources, and so on. This requires reticence and 
recognition of  distance without being in a hurry to add new content to existing 
curricula and bodies of knowledge. It is along these lines that I’d like to discuss 
what I call “ontological respect.”  
 
to predetermine what it must look like. To be sure, Tuck and Yang conclude their piece with an assertion 
of the open-ended future of decolonization, but that openness is belied by the repeated assertion of land 
ownership/entitlement and that it will entail “abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be 
commensurable to Native peoples” (p. 36). The epochē I am proposing here, however, suspends both settler 
desire for future security as well as any present claims about what “land” will mean in the future. 
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ONTOLOGICAL RESPECT 
Ontological respect is not driven by rights claims or even by the desire to 
overcome colonialization, although it is consistent with these things and may be 
a necessary condition for them. Ontological respect is driven by the pursuit of 
wisdom and is characterized by reticence and recognition of distance.73 Rather 
than immediately seeking to diminish distance, ontological respect holds back, 
allowing distance to show itself and remain what it is. Ontological respect is not 
in a hurry. It has no overarching agenda that must be satisfied, nor does it have 
a predetermined endpoint that must be reached. It doesn’t seek moral approval, 
and it doesn’t presume its own virtue. It allows the other to be other, not out of 
moral respect for rights or for the universal dignity of persons, but out of respect 
for (a cautious “looking back” to) an experience of being. Ontological respect 
does not desire to accommodate or appropriate such experience to one’s own, still 
less does it seek to flatter or condescendingly “validate” anything. Rather, it 
merely seeks to understand, and it is ready to recognize when it doesn’t. 
“Understanding,” for its part is not about appropriation or assimilation to 
predetermined paradigms, but rather is a listening that carefully attends in an 
effort to let something show itself in its own terms and thereby show itself truly. 
Such listening is not about hearing another person out, or empathetically 
listening to the personal struggles and traumas of individuals. It is about hearing 
what is said in a language, hearing a way of being, a worlding.  
But in order to be careful, such listening strives to be circumspect in an 
awareness of one’s own experience of being and therefore also of one’s own 
predetermined paradigms that conceal or reveal that experience. To put it more 
simply, in order to truly listen to the other, I must also listen to myself, where the 
“self ” I hear is not my individual ego but rather the particular configuration of 
historical reverberations that determine my own experience of being. In order to 
listen, I must keep myself from getting in the way and becoming “all mouth and 
 
73 Heidegger too speaks of “reticence” (Verschwiegenheit) with respect to authentic human existence (Heidegger 
1996, 283), but whereas he locates it in the call of conscience back to authentic existence per se, my usage 
here refers to the specific mode of existence that is an authentic being-with-others (Mitsein). Held in common 
with Heidegger’s sense of the term, however, is the call out of idle public chatter (Gerede) in order to listen in 
“authentic silence.” Heidegger writes that “reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein [human 
existence] so primordially that it gives rise to a genuine potentiality for hearing and to a being-with-one-
another that is transparent” (Heidegger 1996, 159). 
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no ears,”74 which means suspending my presuppositions in order to let the matter 
show itself in its own terms rather than in terms I impose upon it. In 
phenomenology such suspension is called the epochē – literally a “holding back” 
– and it refers to the “bracketing out” of everything I take for granted in my 
natural everyday attitude as well as the metaphysical baggage that saturates my 
habitual language and thought.  
Now oddly enough, considering Heidegger’s own disastrous political 
engagements,75 an interesting model of cross-cultural reticence and recognition 
of distance can be found in a largely neglected dialogue Heidegger wrote in 
1954.76 The dialogue is in part fictional and in part based upon an actual meeting 
that took place between Heidegger and Tezuka Tomio, a professor at the 
Imperial University in Tokyo. A major caveat is in order, however: this is not a 
dialogue between colonizers and the colonized, and so it cannot be simplistically 
adopted wholesale without modification. As its subtitle indicates, it is a dialogue 
between “a Japanese and an Inquirer” in which the “inquirer” is apparently 
Heidegger himself. Hence its context is one of a post WWII intercultural 
exchange between members of distant societies that had recently come to terms 
out of one of the deadliest conflicts in human history. Nonetheless, despite the 
fact that it is a dialogue between members of two different colonizing nations, it 
is instructive in its reticence and respect for distance. In addition, unlike the well-
known Platonic dialogues, it is a dialogue across cultures – or, even better framed 
 
74 D. H. Justice, ‘All mouth and no ears: Settlers with opinions’ [online], The Conversation, 2017. Available at: 
https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/all-mouth-and-no-ears-settlers-with-
opinions/?google_editors_picks=true  [accessed Dec. 4, 2019].   
75 There is no need for me to add to the voluminous work that has been done on this topic. For some recent 
appraisals, see A. Mitchell and P.Trawny, Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: Responses to anti-Semitism, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2017. My own approach to Heidegger’s infamous involvement with national 
socialism is that, whatever one makes of it, I can still glean much that is of value from the Heideggerian 
corpus without running the slightest risk of either falling prey to fascism and antisemitism or of naively 
“validating” these noxious ideologies. Since Heidegger’s text is explicitly framed as a set of “formal 
indications” (formale Anzeige) that must be filled out and enacted by the reader’s own phenomenological 
engagement with the matter itself (die Sache selbst), it is performative rather than indicative (Dahlstrom 1994). 
To maintain then, as some do, that remaining sympathetic to Heidegger’s philosophy on any level is to find 
oneself complicit in such ideologies is to misunderstand the phenomenological text on a merely indicative, 
non-phenomenological level as a repository of ideas one should be wary of adopting.  
76 Heidegger, ‘A Dialogue on Language’, in On the Way to Language, trans. P. Hertz, New York, Harper & 
Rowe, 1971, pp. 1-54. Henceforth cited in the text as “DL.” 
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in Blaser’s terms, a dialogue across heterogenous worldings.  
The dialogue begins in reminiscence of Shūzō Kuki, a former student of 
Heidegger’s from Japan who had since deceased, but it immediately turns to what 
had occupied much of his reflections: Iki, a Japanese word ambiguously 
connected to art.77 However, as soon as the idea of “aesthetics” is invoked to 
frame the discussion, Heidegger interjects a note of caution insofar as this 
Western concept stems from a European tradition foreign to the Japanese world. 
What recommends Western concepts to Tezuka, however, is not even so much a 
superficial connection between Iki and aesthetics but rather the “modern 
technicalization and industrialization of every continent” which would seem to 
permit of no escape from the “European conceptual systems” Heidegger wishes 
to hold at bay in any authentic encounter with non-Western worlds. And yet, this 
“no escape” is an initial appearance which may only be a semblance insofar as 
“the technical world which sweeps us along must confine itself to surface matters,” 
leaving open the possibility of a “true encounter” between Japanese and 
European existence (DL 2-3). The dialogue is thus framed from the start in terms 
of an incommensurability, but not a dogmatically asserted one. Rather than the 
kind of stalemate suggested by Tuck and Yang, this is the potentially fruitful 
incommensurability of the phenomenological epochē that holds at bay the 
intrusions which threaten to cover it over. Nonetheless the danger remains that, 
as Tezuka puts it, “we [the Japanese] will let ourselves be led astray by the wealth 
of concepts which the spirit of the European languages has in store, and will look 
down upon what claims our existence, as on something that is vague and 
amorphous” (DL 3). But this danger can only be staved off by keeping 
incommensurability in full view, that is, by remaining in the epochē that suspends 
hasty connections and well-intentioned comparisons.  
 
77 My interpretation is diametrically opposed to that of Michael Marra, for whom the dialogue is merely a 
monologue reflecting Heidegger’s own philosophical presumptions (a failure ultimately due the purported 
impossibility of any real encounter with otherness that Marra draws from Kuki’s poetry – see Michael 
Marra, Essays on Japan, Brill Academic Publishers, 2010, pp.168-9 and passim). However, Marra not only 
provides little to support this assumption beyond a superficial comparison of the way iki is defined in 
Heidegger’s dialogue as opposed the way it is defined in Kuki’s own work, but he also makes no discernible 
attempt to first understand how iki comes to be thought in either source, and he ignores the presence of 
Tezuka as well as the cautious, tentative character of all that is said in the dialogue.  
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That there is no facile “solution” being offered here quickly becomes apparent 
in that the difficulty facing the epochē has to do with the nature of language itself. 
Heidegger’s oft-cited assertion that language is the “house of being,” meaning 
that one’s fundamental experience of being-in-the-world is articulated in and 
through one’s language, is reinvoked in this dialogue, minimally implying that, at 
least in some cases, translation may be impossible. Heidegger readily admits that, 
although Kuki had an “uncommonly good command” of several European 
languages, he himself remains at a disadvantage: “But we were discussing Iki; and 
here it was I to whom the spirit of the Japanese language remained closed – as it 
is to this day” (DL 4). Hence the very fact that this dialogue takes place in 
German, and in view of Heidegger’s own admitted ignorance of the Japanese 
language, Tezuka reframes the danger in their dialogue up to that point as one 
inherent within language: “The language of the dialogue constantly destroyed 
the possibility of saying what the dialogue was about” (DL 5). 
However, the statement is cautiously worded in the past tense, indicating that 
this may not necessarily hold for the future. So even though Europeans may 
“dwell in an entirely different house” than the Japanese, leading Heidegger to 
skeptically say that “a dialogue from house to house remains nearly impossible,” 
Tezuka rejoins, “You are right to say ‘nearly’. For still it was a dialogue” (DL 5). 
Hence dialogue can nonetheless take place, but only within and in terms of the 
incommensurability revealed by the epochē, and it will not go unnoticed that it 
is the non-Westerner Tezuka who calls both interlocutors back to this open future. 
Without the epochē, the two parties may well believe they’re having a dialogue 
because they use the same words – words like “worldview” for instance – but if 
they mean very different things by the same word, the appearance of a dialogue 
is mere semblance. Indeed, Tezuka explicitly calls attention to the Kurosawa film 
Rashomon, which foregrounds very different interpretations of the same event 
within the same language (DL 16-17).78 And Heidegger must even remain reticent 
about his own assertion that language is the house of being, expressing 
 
78 Even though Tezuka invokes the film as an example of Europeanization within Japanese culture through 
photographic objectification, it will not have been lost on the reader that the film makes radical difference 
visible behind the apparent sameness of a commonly perceived event, surely not accidentally invoked in the 
context of a discussion about whether or not “language” means the same thing across cultures.  
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uncertainty as to whether or not the nature of language as he has tried to 
understand it is appropriate for the Japanese language at all (DL 8). 
But insofar as their dialogue does indeed continue, it does so in light of a 
future that is only dimly discerned, an undefined something that is hesitantly 
called “the nature of language” or “the house of being” – perhaps what Husserl 
might have called an indeterminate determinacy – that draws the dialogue 
forward even as its participants do not clearly see the outcome. Once that which 
calls forth the dialogue becomes barely visible, the two interlocutors resolve not 
to violate the silence of its call, but rather to leave it “in unimpaired possession of 
the voice of its promptings” (DL 22). It is this resolve that opens the way for 
Heidegger to pose the question: “What does the Japanese world understand by 
language?” (DL 23). Tezuka takes a moment of meditative silence before 
attempting an answer, a silence respected by the unhurried patience of both 
parties. The silence grants the reticence to let the being of language come to 
utterance in Japanese – as opposed to fishing around for a Japanese word that 
says something about language. As the interlocutors put it, the task is not to speak 
about language, but to speak from language (DL 26). Staving off the temptation of 
conceptual representation, what is sought is more like a “hint” than a category. 
But Tezuka withholds the Japanese word he has in mind, not in order to be coy, 
but because, “We understand only too well that a thinker would prefer to hold 
back the word that is to be said, not in order to keep it for himself, but to bear it 
toward his encounter with what is to be thought” (DL 50-1).  
The interplay between incommensurability and unity, or difference and 
sameness, in the dialogue is complex. In and through holding open the difference, 
a hint of something the same emerges, until Tezuka exclaims, “I sense a deeply 
concealed kinship with our thinking, precisely because your path of thinking and 
its language are so wholly other,” prompting Heidegger to raise the “question of 
the site in which the kinship … comes into play.” The hint of kinship is only made 
manifest by holding open the boundless distance Tezuka relates to the Japanese 
word Ku, “the sky’s emptiness” (DL 40-1). 
Returning to the question about the Japanese understanding of language, 
Tezuka hesitantly gives it voice: Koto ba. Heidegger does not ask what the words 
mean, which would lead back to conceptual representations and Western 
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metaphysics. Rather, he asks what the words say. That is, in what way does the 
essence of language in the Japanese world come to utterance in these words? 
Having long abandoned the Western metaphysical notion of aesthetics as 
unhelpful in understanding Japanese, the word Iki had been tentatively defined 
as “the pure delight of the beckoning stillness,” which now proves useful insofar 
as Koto “names that which in the event gives delight, itself, that which uniquely in 
each unrepeatable moment comes to radiance in the fullness of its grace” (DL 
45). One not only notices the absence of anything like the sensual/intelligible 
dualism bound up in conceptions of material signifiers and their cognitive 
significations, but also the singularity of a unique and unrepeatable moment that 
would seem to be far removed from the universality associated with general terms 
employed to designate multiple instances. “Ba” in turn names “the petals that 
stem from Koto,” (DL 47) which all leads to saying the nature of language in the 
Japanese world as “flower petals that flourish out of the lightening message of the 
graciousness that brings forth” (DL 53). 
It is not my purpose here to develop the nuances of this strange sounding 
“definition” of language. Rather, I only call attention to the reticence and respect 
for distance with which the interlocutors wind up speaking from (as opposed to 
about) language in a way that will make little sense from the perspective of Western 
metaphysics, which is placed in epochal brackets throughout the dialogue.79 
Another thing we learn from this dialogue is that it is not sufficient to merely say 
that cultural members should articulate their own tradition as its sole authorities, 
because they also may inadvertently adopt Western metaphysical categories and 
then stand within an ontological framework foreign to them. For instance, when 
Heidegger refers to Kuki’s explanation of Iki as a “sensuous radiance through 
whose lively delight there breaks the radiance of something suprasensuous,” 
 
79 Although the epochē prohibits hasty connections, we might cautiously invoke the Lnu’uk languages in 
this context insofar as the various senses of Lnu’uk words and stories, on Sa'ke'j Henderson’s account, seem 
to be open to future modifications according to context – perhaps indicating an altogether different, 
temporal and process-oriented understanding of “universality” (see L’nu Humanities, in Battiste 2016, 29ff.). 
Necessarily constrained by the English language in his account, Henderson writes, “The Lnu’uk language 
arose as a method to explain or to change energies, to contain or express them and their transformations” 
(Battiste 2016, 35). Given the methodological approach I’m advocating here, I would zero in precisely where 
the Indigenous sayings make the least sense in terms of Western metaphysics (see the following discussion 
about Heidegger’s method of interpreting ancient Greek texts).  
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Tezuka immediately embraces it as expressing how the Japanese experience art. 
What could be more authentic than a respected Japanese scholar speaking to a 
European about the Japanese experience? But once again, however, the epochē 
must be invoked insofar as the very sensuous/suprasensuous binary upon which 
Kuki’s own explanation depends is itself a long-standing Western metaphysical 
opposition tracing back to the Platonic division between the sensuous world of 
becoming and the intelligible realm of ideas and persisting in various forms up 
through the modernist European distinction between realism and idealism (DL 
14).  
But revealing the fruitful nature of the incommensurability opened by the 
epochē, the interlocutors learn from this that the way Westerners often 
understand the nature of language – namely, as a sign system founded upon the 
distinction between material signifiers and non-material significations – is itself 
based upon the very same metaphysical sensuous/suprasensuous binary, 
prompting Tezuka to assert a radical difference between the European and the 
Japanese ways of understanding their own languages. Here we begin to get a 
sense of how sedimented metaphysical notions can be, even lodging themselves 
in seemingly innocent references to “language.” Hence once again the temptation 
“to rely on European ways of representation and their concepts” must be 
suspended. Heidegger even goes as far as to add that such “temptation is 
reinforced by a process which I would call the complete Europeanization of the 
earth and of man,” which indicates coloniality without explicitly naming it as such 
(DL 15). Throughout the dialogue, the danger not only never disappears but 
keeps recurring in slightly different forms and at ever more sedimented layers: 
from individual words and concepts like “aesthetics,” to the differences between 
languages, to the very idea that we understand the same thing by the word 
“language” when we make the comparison.  
As we can see from this exchange, the fact that one may belong to a certain 
culture offers no assurance against the occlusion of that culture through Western 
metaphysical concepts. There is no authoritative guarantee of authenticity. The 
fact that Tezuka is Japanese doesn’t prevent him from eagerly seizing upon 
Western notions in the attempt to render the full sense of key Japanese words 
transparent. Although caution is first suggested by Heidegger in reference to 
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Kuki’s use of the term “aesthetics,” Tezuka quickly sees the point and the dialogue 
proceeds in view of a mutual desire to connect whose zeal is tempered by 
reticence and respect for distance.  
The absence of any authoritative guarantee of authenticity extends to Western 
culture and history as well. Merely being a European or an heir of Europe not 
only offers no such guarantee with respect to Western culture and history but, in 
Heidegger’s view, a genuine understanding of the roots of the European 
experience of being is rare even among Europeans. This is particularly evident 
in Heidegger’s method for interpreting ancient Greek texts, the understanding of 
which is often obscured when naively read through the metaphysical spectacles 
of subsequent Western history. His interpretation of the Presocratic philosopher 
Anaximander is a case in point, one which I take as a model for recovering the 
ontological senses and nuances of an experience of being from their concealment 
behind the metaphysical baggage of habitual concepts and terms.  
Of course, an objection immediately comes to mind: when Heidegger 
interprets the ancient Greeks, he is dealing with material that stands at the 
beginning of Western history and so is hardly negotiating a cross-cultural 
connection. Indeed, this is a point Michael Marra makes with respect to 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Holderlin’s poetry, which Heidegger connects to the 
ancient Greeks, as opposed to Kuki’s poetry, which has no such Western 
connection and so is more truly “other.”80 Certainly, Greek influence on 
subsequent Western history up to the present day is undeniable. However, a few 
important considerations are overlooked here.  
First, in spite of Western valorization of the Greeks, there is no assurance that 
we have access to Presocratic thought at all. All we have are “fragments,” which 
are not bits of papyrus discovered in archaeological digs, but rather are citations 
made by later authors. For instance, the only actual fragment we have of 
Anaximander’s writing is a citation by an Aristotelian commentator named 
Simplicius who lived over an entire millennium after Anaximander’s time. Prior 
to the modern printing press, the possibility that contingent variables may alter 
original sources become greater with the passage of time, and a millennium is a 
 
80 Marra op.cit. 
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significant passage of time to say the least. What modifications, intentional or 
otherwise, may have occurred through the hands of successive copyists? And how 
accurately did Simplicius even cite the copy he had before him? Compounding 
this difficulty is the fact that we now look at these texts after almost two more 
millennia.81  
Nonetheless, and of particular importance from a methodological 
perspective, it is precisely the retroactive historical sedimentation of successive 
interpretation that Heidegger suspends when looking at ancient Greek texts. 
Anything that suggests the ideas of later authors is subtracted in the hope of 
yielding something that speaks from out of the ancient Greek world undistorted 
by subsequent lenses. In this respect Heidegger’s eventual translation looks quite 
strange, much like the definition of language at which Heidegger and Tezuka 
finally arrive. But the very strangeness of  its appearance is methodologically useful in 
warding off customary assumptions and habitual concepts that otherwise easily 
intrude. Heidegger writes that even where “philological and historical research 
has occupied itself more thoroughly with the philosophers before Plato and 
Aristotle, their interpretation is still guided by modern versions of Platonic and 
Aristotelian representations and concepts.”82 Thus the Presocratics are often 
today understood as if they were theorizing about nature, but it was not until 
Aristotle that “nature” (phusis) became seen as a separate realm of inquiry over 
and against the realm of artefacts (techne).83 Heidegger even winds up replacing 
his own cherished phrase “the being of beings” – since it’s “neither clear nor 
firmly established what we ourselves think with the words ‘being’ and ‘to be’”84 – 
with “the presencing of what is present” (replacing Sein with Anwesen). Despite all 
these cautions, Heidegger’s success in transposing himself and his readers into 
what “was thought and thinkable in such terms – as distinct from the prevailing 
representations of later times” is not a settled matter.85 
 
81 Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, pp. 245. 
82 Ibid., p. 243.  
83 And even here, as Heidegger notes, it is not Platonic and Aristotelian concepts themselves but modern 
versions of those concepts that intrude – concepts such as “nature,” from the Latin natura, often casually 
invoked as if this word means essentially the same thing as the Greek phusis. 
84 Ibid., p. 252. 
85 Ibid., p. 256. 
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So too are the languages very different and, although Heidegger would like 
to believe that Western Europeans share a common “history of being” with the 
ancient Greeks, such an assumption is hardly assured, especially given the fact 
that Greek and German (as well as English) may well each embody entirely 
different “houses of being.” Therefore Heidegger states that “it is necessary that, 
before the translating, our thinking is translated into what is said in Greek. To 
make this thoughtful translation to what comes to language in the saying is to 
leap over a gulf.” To “translate” in German is übersetzen, literally to displace or 
cross (setzen) over (über); the Latin roots of the English “translate” have a similar 
meaning (trans, “across,” plus lātus, “carried,” hence literally to “carry over”). But 
whereas the Latin roots indicate carrying something over, the German indicates 
actually crossing over, which implicates the translator as well as what is translated. 
In order to translate a language, one must also at the same time transpose oneself 
into the world of that language. However, in order to carry out this crossing over, 
the epochē is necessary: “In order to trans-late ourselves into that which comes 
to language in the saying we must, prior to all translating, consciously set aside 
all inappropriate preconceptions.”86 Moreover, in order to be successful, the 
epochē requires a unique kind of careful listening insofar as “even this casting 
aside of presuppositions wherever we find them inappropriate is insufficient so 
long as we fail to allow ourselves to be drawn into and to listen for that which 
comes to language in the saying.”87 Once again, the epochē is characterized by 
an ontological respect that carefully listens before it speaks, recognizing distance 
and understanding the ever-present possibility of error.  
Ontological respect, as a looking back that listens to what a word says out of 
the world of that language, does well to look back to the original senses of words 
with the kind of care and caution afforded by the epochē and practiced by 
Heidegger in the attempted recovery of the ancient Greek experience of being. 
Because it looks back to – that is, respects – the world in which the word first 
arose and made sense, such care regarding language is not just a pedantic 
exercise. Looking back to that world is not to privilege the past in reactionary 
nostalgia. Rather, it belongs to the epochē in suspending what has subsequently 
 
86 Ibid., p. 250.  
87 Ibid. 
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come along to obscure that sense and that world in order to open a future that is 
not directed into the predetermined pathways of subsequent occlusions. 
THE INTERCULTURAL EPOCHĒ 
When it comes to a dialogue between the heirs of Europe and Indigenous 
peoples, of course, there are important differences. Not only is commonality 
hardly assured, but any assumed “sameness” must also itself be placed within the 
epochē. Here we depart from Heidegger’s hermeneutical circularity in which he 
assumes a sameness can be reached by translating Greek words into the language 
of “being,” and in turn suggests that such assumed sameness validates the 
translation.88 Even though the subsequent history of Western thought has 
prevented hearing/reading the early Greeks in their own terms, that history has 
been in large part a response to the early Greeks nonetheless. Hence even if the 
connection is one of oblivion, as Heidegger maintains, it’s still a connection of 
some sort, and so he assumes a “same” – i.e. that to which Western history has been 
a long and protracted series of responses, whatever one makes of it – as a 
provisional direction for interpretation that is admittedly fraught with the 
possibility of error.  
Unlike the ancient Greek world, no world of Indigenous peoples has ever 
served as a measure or touchstone to which Western history is challenged to look 
back in respect in order to respond in various ways. For the most part Western 
history has not been a series of responses to Indigenous peoples, and it can hardly 
be unequivocally characterized by a respectful regard that attempts to hear what 
is said from out of their worlds. As is well known, Western history has often been 
one of imposition, domination, and exploitation that recognized neither duty nor 
desire to thoughtfully respond to colonized peoples or to their worldings. If 
Western history can be characterized as oblivion with respect to its own roots at 
the ontological level, it might be characterized as oblivion with respect to 
coloniality at the ontic level.89  
 
88 Ibid., p. 251. 
89 There is of course also an alternate current in modern Western history, influenced by Herder, that defends 
colonized people against their colonizers, so it is not my intention here to be reductive about Western 
responses to colonization. The degree to which the values of Western liberal democracies can or should be 
adopted by non-Western societies, however, remains a problem lying outside the scope of this essay.  
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Hence an intercultural epochē with respect to Indigenous peoples can neither 
assume nor anticipate sameness. Indeed, it must actively suspend any such 
assumption or anticipation since, if anything is assumed, it is incommensurability. 
To put it another way, rather than an assumption or anticipation of commonality, 
a respect for distance constitutes the interpretative context. As in the dialogue 
between Heidegger and Tezuka, no such sameness is assumed, and so a very 
different hermeneutical approach must be taken – one that deploys an even more 
radical epochē. Not only are Western metaphysical notions and ways of 
experiencing the world put in suspension, but so also is any assumption of 
sameness. Only thereby can we hope to stave off the well-intentioned haste, like 
that which repeatedly crops up in the “Dialogue on Language,” to find common 
ground, a haste that often results in further occlusion.  
The fact that there is no authoritative guarantee of authenticity, as mentioned 
previously, is further problematized when communication is carried out in 
English with respect to a settler audience. However, in the face of these obstacles 
I would suggest that the epochē, even if practiced implicitly and only sporadically, 
may allow something authentic to shine through the shroud of the Western 
experience of being. For instance Marie Battiste, citing primarily Western 
scholars, characterizes precontact Mi’kmaw pictographs as symbols that 
“portray” or “represent” abstract ideas and empirical objects, thereby assuming 
a sensual/intelligible binary.90 I suspect, however, that she may be closer to the 
Mi’kmaw world when she explicitly suspends the Western “is/ought” dichotomy 
in order to suggest that “All aspects of Mi’kmaw life (i.e. Mi’kmaw law, Mi’kmaw 
religion and Mi’kmaw art), expressed the view that the ideal and actuality were 
fundamentally inseparable.” It is of course necessary to proceed further and 
bracket terms like “ideal” and the classically Aristotelian “actuality,” but we get 
the sense that this might be a fruitful point of departure for peeling back the layers 
of settler semblance enshrouding the Mi’kmaw world. However, because the 
epochē is not explicitly practiced as an intercultural methodology, she quickly 
slips back into the customary Western metaphysical lexicon by asserting that “the 
people sought to discover the universal lessons behind the ideals of a changing 
 
90 Marie Battiste (ed.), Visioning a Mi’kmaw Humanities: Indigenizing the academy, Sydney, NS, Cape Breton 
University Press, 2016, p. 134.  
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world. This unity of consciousness bonded the people into a strong worldview 
and an ideal of the Good…”91 Without an explicit methodology of the epochē, 
momentary interruptions of Western metaphysics by Indigenous 
incommensurability will be quickly covered over and metaphysically laden 
vocabulary will invade the text, inadvertently reinstating the very “cognitive 
imperialism” one sought to escape. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
ubiquitous use of the word “worldview” by Indigenous advocates. 
Now if merely ensuring that a purportedly authoritative member of a culture 
speak about that culture offers no assurance against occlusion through Western 
metaphysics, the problem is only exacerbated by the history of colonialism. Such 
Western terms are adopted not only because they’re readily available, but also 
because Indigenous people find themselves forced to speak the language of the 
colonizer in order to be understood at all. The cruel irony in this is that such an 
expedient to being heard actually prevents being heard. So you want us to respect 
your worldview? Great – we can all have our own worldviews in the big happy 
Cartesian family of intersubjectivity. Or – worse still – we can all contribute our 
worldviews to the big data picture of multicultural information within the total 
framework of constant availability. Then all such worldviews will be stored on 
hand and readily accessible for extraction as required. Everything gets annexed 
and, in their very availability, Indigenous experiences of being are concealed once 
again.  
According to the argument I’ve laid out here, this is not respect; it is 
appropriation – inadvertent appropriation, perhaps, but appropriation 
nonetheless. It is also an annexation of Indigeneity when Indigenous people 
themselves demand that their “worldviews” be respected. The inadvertent and 
non-ethno-specific character of this annexation again underlines the fact that it 
is not a matter of changing our attitudes, which would preserve the metaphysical 
subject who “has” an attitude toward or a perspective on an objective world that 
is refracted differently through different cultural lenses. An attitude is something 
I adopt, a stance I take, a way in which I position myself. The point – for myself 
as a white settler, at any rate – is not to adopt a position or take a stance, but to 
suspend my positions and stances. What is needed is a heedful listening, which is 
 
91 Ibid., p. 138.  
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only possible through the recognition and suspension of the Western experience 
of being in which we stand, and which in turn may open the possibility of 
experiencing things differently – although the latter cannot be the goal without 
instrumentalizing it and throwing us right back into the totalizing framework. 
This suspension of the Western experience of being as well as the anticipation of 
commonality while making Western metaphysical concepts explicit for 
bracketing is what I call the intercultural epochē,92 and constitutes the ontological 
respect characterized by reticence and recognition of distance. As Heidegger’s 
inquirer reticently ventures to his Japanese interlocutor: 
The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer to the nature of language is still 
veiled, in all its vastness. This is why I do not yet see whether what I am trying to 
think of as the nature of language is also adequate for the nature of East Asian 
language; whether in the end – which would also be the beginning – a nature of 
language can reach the thinking experience, a nature which would offer the 
assurance that European-Western saying and East Asian saying will enter into 
dialogue such that in it there sings something that wells up from a single source (DL 
8). 
Finding such a “single source” is the desire for genuine connection and being 
with one another. But we mustn’t be in a hurry to get there.  
 
 
92 Although a better term might be something like “inter-worldly epochē” in that it invokes the heterogeneity 
of worldings at the ontological level as opposed to the problematic and perhaps over-used notion of 
“culture,” for the present at least I retain the latter term for its greater traction and recognizability.  
